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Clearing Away the Mist: Suggestions
for Developing
a Principled Veil
Piercing Doctrine in China
ABSTRACT

It was less than thirty years ago that China stood
economically isolated from the rest of the world. Times have
certainly changed. Today China's economy is one of the fastest
growing in the world, and Western businesses are inundating
the country to access the abundance of cheap labor. Corporate
activity is progressing,yet it was only twelve years ago that
China enacted its first corporate law which officially recognized
the concept of limited liability. And it was not until less than a
year ago that China recognized one of the most important (and
most often litigated) corporate law doctrines: piercing the
corporateveil.
This Note considers how the veil piercing doctrine fits into
China's civil law system. In the United States, the doctrine has
developed progressively through the courts. This Note argues
that, contrary to the U.S. doctrine, veil piercing in China must
be codified with specificity if it is to play a significant role. In
particular, the statute must lay out guidelines for Chinese
courts to follow when deciding whether to pierce the veil. The
current veil piercing statute, enacted in January 2006, is too
ambiguous to be useful. If left unchanged, it will likely produce
the same confusion and unpredictability that has plagued the
doctrine in the United States. As a result, this Note suggests
specific guidelines that could be codified to avoid this result and
to strengthen the doctrine's usefulness in China's civil law
system.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Judge Cardozo once famously described the concept of piercing
the corporate veil as being "enveloped in the mists of metaphor."'
Despite the passage of eighty years, his colorful description of
corporate veil piercing continues to be as timely and relevant as ever.
Perhaps one fact best exemplifies the continued truth of his
statement: "[p]iercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in
[U.S.] corporate law."'2 The concept is not unique to U.S. law,
however. Nearly all developed economies have adopted concepts
analogous to the U.S. veil piercing doctrine.3 Until quite recently, a
notable exception had been China, one of the world's fastest growing
economies. 4 However, China formally recognized the doctrine of veil
piercing when the revised Company Law of China became effective on
5
January 1, 2006.
This Note explores China's veil piercing doctrine. Before delving
into Chinese law, and in order to establish a background for
reference, Part II explains the concept of limited liability as it is

1.
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926), reh'g denied, 155
N.E. 914 (N.Y. 1927).
2.
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991).
3.
"Lifting the corporate veil" is the term used to describe veil piercing in
England. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 5:3 (West 2004)
(1991). In Germany, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is known as
"Durchgriffshaftung." Id. § 5:5. The Japanese law which concerns veil piercing is called
"hinin hojinkaku," which translates as "disregarding the corporate personality." Id. §
5:6. Argentinean courts have been piercing the corporate veil, there known as "abuso
de la personalidad juridica," since the 1930s. Id. § 5:2. France's piercing doctrine
resembles the doctrine in Argentina. Id.
4.
Prior to the amended Company Law becoming effective in January 2006,
Chinese courts had recognized veil piercing under only the most limited circumstances.
See infra text accompanying notes 170-181. However, since China is a civil law country
and the power of the courts is quite restricted, the doctrine had no real standing in
Chinese corporate law until it was codified in the amended Company Law. See infra
notes 186-93.
5.
See The Company Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994,
amended Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/
resupload/epdf/e04457.pdf [hereinafter The Company Law].
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generally understood. This Part also defines piercing the corporate
veil and discusses its application in U.S. jurisdictions. Having laid the
foundation, Part III begins the analysis of Chinese law with a brief
recitation of China's political and economic history over the past sixty
years, followed by a more detailed discussion of the general
framework of the Company Law and its key characteristics. Also,
Part III examines the current state of veil piercing in China. China's
civil law system mandates that the doctrine be codified in a statute
rather than developing through common law-as has been the
experience in U.S. jurisdictions. 6 This Part concludes with a
discussion of some of the advantages and disadvantages of the
statutory and common law approaches. Part IV argues that the veil
piercing provision in the Company Law is inadequate. Because China
is a civil law country and because its courts have very little discretion
to adjudicate cases outside the four corners of the statute, the
provision needs more specificity as to the factors that courts should
consider when deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil. In
particular, the Company Law should distinguish between situations
where a creditor seeks to pierce to reach another corporation and
where a creditor seeks to reach an individual. The history of veil
piercing in the U.S. suggests that the two situations require different
analyses, and therefore, the Company Law should delineate with
some degree of specificity the factors that courts should consider in
each case. Finally, the Company Law should distinguish between
voluntary (contract) and involuntary (tort) creditors.

II. LIMITED

LIABILITY AND VEIL PIERCING

A. Limited Liability
Limited liability is perhaps the distinguishing feature of
corporate law.7 Limited liability means that investors in a corporation
are not responsible for more than their capital contributions to the

6.
See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the
Problem?, 37 CONN. L. REV. 619, 623 (2005).
7.

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

OF CORPORATE LAW 40 (1991). Professor Presser noted: "It is now accepted as one of the
first principles of American law that those who own shares in corporations, whether
such shareholders are individuals or are themselves corporations, normally are not
liable for the debts of their corporations." PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:1.
The president of Columbia University also commented on the importance of limited
liability: "[Tihe limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern
times [and] even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited liability
" Id.
corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it ..
§ 1:1 (quoting President Butler of Columbia University).
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corporation. 8 Likewise, a corporation's managers and workers are not
vicariously liable for the firm's debts or other obligations.9 Because of
limited liability, a corporation is considered its own legal "person"-it
is an entity separate from its shareholders, directors, or officers. 10
The rationale for and advantages of limited liability are severalfold.
First, "limited liability allows
[for]
more efficient
diversification."' 1 Limited liability permits investors to decrease their
12
If
exposure to risk by owning diversified portfolios of assets.
unlimited liability existed, the risk faced by an investor would turn
on the wealth of other investors because creditors would be more
likely to go after the wealthiest of the investors.1 3 Therefore,
diversification in the context of unlimited liability would increase
rather than decrease the risk faced by investors. "If any one firm
went bankrupt, an investor could lose his entire wealth,"'1 4 so he
would therefore invest in a relatively few number of firms and
monitor those firms more closely. Said differently, if an investor had
to supply unlimited amounts of capital to satisfy a corporation's
15
obligations, "[he] would be reluctant to make small investments."'
Rather than many smaller investments, people would make relatively
fewer larger investments. 16 The result would be lower economic
activity.

17

8.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1985); Thompson, supra note 2, at 1039. For
example, "[a] person who pays $100 for stock risks [only] that $100" and nothing more.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 40. Likewise, a person who buys a bond for
$100 risks only $100. Id.
The corporate veil is another way of expressing the basic principle that a
corporation's shareholders will not be held liable for the obligations of the corporation.
David M. Albert, Comment, Addressing Abuse of the Corporate Entity in the People's
Republic of China: New Thoughts on China's Need for a Defined Veil PiercingDoctrine,
23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 873, 873-74 (2002).
9.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 90. "[Elasily the most distinctive
attribute of the corporation is its existence in the eye of the law as a legal entity and
artificial personality distinct and separate from the stockholders and officers who
compose it .
I..."
1. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND
ALLIED CORPORATE PROBLEMS 11 (1929).

10.
Thompson, supra note 2, at 1039.
11.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 43. Diversification is "the act of
investing in a wide range of companies to reduce the risk if one sector of the market
suffers losses." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 511 (8th ed. 2004).
12.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 43.
13.
See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1040. For example, if Shareholder X was
worth $100 and Shareholder Y was worth $100,000, the creditors would seek to recoup
their losses by going after Shareholder Y since he has more assets.
14.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 43.
15.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 90. "The rational strategy under
unlimited liability. . . would be to minimize the number of securities held." Id. at 97.
16.
See id. at 90.
17.
Thompson, supra note 2, at 1040. Concurrently, investors would be forced
to bear risk that diversification would have enabled them to avoid, "and the cost to
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Additionally, "[ijimited liability decreases the need to monitor
agents."1 8 The agency-problem' 9 is inherent in the corporate setting,
and "investors risk losing wealth because of the actions of [their]
agents." 20 Therefore, the more risk that investors bear, the more they
will monitor their agents. 21 However, because limited liability
permits investors to diversify their investments, investors will be
encouraged to hold a larger number of investments, with a smaller
portion of their wealth invested in any one firm. 22 Diversified
investors have neither the incentive 23 nor the expertise to monitor
the actions of specialized agents, so passivity is a more rational
strategy. In turn, the decreased need to monitor 24the agents
potentially reduces the costs of operating the corporation.
The costs of monitoring other shareholders are also reduced by
limited liability. 25 As already discussed, if unlimited liability were the
rule, "the greater the wealth of other shareholders, the lower the
probability that any one shareholder's assets would be needed to pay
a judgment" against the corporation. 26 Therefore, existing
shareholders would have incentives to monitor (presumably at some
cost) other shareholders "to ensure that they do not transfer assets to
others or sell to others with less wealth. '27 Limited liability renders
irrelevant the identity and wealth of other investors, and therefore
28
avoids these costs.
Because limited liability promotes the free transfer of shares, it
gives managers incentives to act efficiently. 29 The ability of investors
30
to sell their ownership interests constrains the actions of agents.
3
Investors respond to inefficient enterprises by disinvesting. i
Assuming shares are tied to votes, "poorly run enterprises will attract
new investors who can . . . install new managerial teams. '3 2 The

firms of raising capital would be greater." EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 7, at
43.
18.

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 41.

19.
See Seth W. Ashby, Note, Strengthening the Public Company Board of
Directors: Limited Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot vs. Required Majority
Board Independence, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 521, 535-38 (2005).

20.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 94.
21.
Id.
Id.
22.
23.
"Because investors' potential losses are 'limited' to the amount of their
investment as opposed to their entire wealth, they spend less to protect their
positions." Id. at 95.
24.

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 42.

25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 95.

28.

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 42.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 95.
Id.

1648

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39.1643

potential that the agent will lose his job provides him with an
incentive to operate efficiently to keep share prices high. 33 By
contrast, under an unlimited liability system, shares would not be

fungible because "[t]heir value would be a function of the present
value of future cash flows and of the wealth of [the other]
shareholders. ' 34 Under such a system, a person wishing to acquire a
controlling number of shares would perhaps have to negotiate with
each individual shareholder, probably paying different prices and
perhaps a surcharge. 35 Therefore, investors would be less likely to
attempt to gain control, and managers would have less fear of losing
36
their jobs.
Finally, limited liability promotes market efficiency. 37 When all
shares trade on the same terms, "investors trade until the price of
shares reflects the available information about a firm's
prospects.... [I]nvestors... can accept the market price as given and
purchase at a 'fair' price. '38 As previously stated, if unlimited liability
were the rule, shares would not be fungible, and therefore, the shares
of a single company would not have one market price. 39 Thus,
investors would be forced to expend greater resources researching the
40
prospects of the firm to determine the right price.
These advantages of limited liability suggest that firms would
attempt to invent limited liability if it did not exist. 41 Firms would

create limited liability by contract; since "[n]onrecourse lenders are
limited to the assets securing the loan, just as lenders to corporations
are limited to the corporate assets," lenders would advance
nonrecourse credit to firms in exchange for higher interest rates. 42 In
43
essence, firms would purchase "failure insurance." Firms would buy
this insurance from the creditors since creditors have a comparative
advantage in assessing the risk involved in a given transaction and
monitoring the conduct of the firm during the agreement. 44 This
arrangement is essentially what is observed with limited liability:

33.
Id.
34.
EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 7, at 42. Under a limited liability
system, "the value of shares is set by the present value of the income generated by a
firm's assets." Id. In other words, shares of a firm trade at one price, and the identity
and wealth of other investors is irrelevant. Id; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8,
at 96.
35.
Id.
36.
See id. at 43.
37.
Id.
38.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 96.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 41.

42.
Id.
43.
Firms would "buy" the insurance in the form of paying higher interest rates
to their creditors. Id. at 48.
44.
Id.
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"[t]he creditors assume some risks of business failure, just as they
would if they were 'insurers... in addition to being creditors. 4 5 "The
legal rule of limited liability is a shortcut to this position, avoiding
'46
the costs of separate transactions.
In sum, limited liability does not eliminate the risk of business
failure, but rather shifts some of the risk of business failure to
creditors. 47 In so doing, the risk of an enterprise is allocated to the
more efficient risk-bearer. 48 If a creditor were permitted to reach an
investor's personal assets after a business failure, investors would be
deterred from investing. 4 9 Limited liability, therefore, encourages
investments.50 The creditors of limited liability companies accept
additional risk, 51 and therefore raise their prices to reflect the risk
they have assumed.5 2 The shift in liability from shareholders to
creditors produces gains for society because "the creditors are more
'53
efficient in evaluating... [and] bearing particular risks.
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil
Even in jurisdictions where this "first principle" 54 of corporate
law has been codified, there are exceptions to the general rule of no
liability for shareholders for corporate debt.5 5 In other words, limited
liability is not an absolute protection. One exception to the general
rule of limited liability is the piercing the veil doctrine, which is a
rule "to fasten liability to shareholders of corporations . . . for
corporate debts of all kinds. '5 6 Piercing the corporate veil, then, is one
example of when the separateness of the corporation will not be
respected. The purpose of piercing the corporate veil is "to decreas[e]

45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 49-50. The economic problem can be succinctly stated: "[Ils it better
to allow losses to lie where they fall or to shift those losses to some other risk bearer?"
Id. "The market's answer [via limited liability] is partial risk shifting." Id. While
"[e]quity investors bear more risk than debt investors, . . .debt investors continue to
bear substantial risk, and the risk of all investors is limited to the amount they
contribute at the outset." Id. If greater risk shifting were beneficial, it would have
evolved in the market. Id.
48.
Thompson, supra note 2, at 1039.
49.

Id.

50.
G. Michael Epperson & Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder's
Ultimate Calamity: Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of
Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 606 (1988); id.
51.
Compare to a creditor of an "identically funded enterprise where the
creditors can pursue" the personal assets of the investors. Thompson, supra note 2, at
1039.
52.
Id. at 1039-40.
53.

Id. at 1040.

54.
55.

Limited liability for shareholders. PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:1.
Id.

56.

Id.
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the incentive created by limited liability to engage in overly risky
57
activities."
In the United States, the circumstances under which it is
deemed appropriate to pierce the corporate veil are determined
according to state law. 58 In general, the "veil" of the "corporate
fiction" is pierced "when a court determines that the debt in question
is not really a debt of the corporation, but ... in fairness ought to be
viewed as a debt of the individual or corporate shareholders."5 9 An
often quoted rule is stated in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator:
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule,
and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the
notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons. 60

The rationales for piercing have been described as "vague and
illusory." 61 Two noted commentators, in one of the most often cited
attempts to give some structure to the doctrine, concede that the law
of veil piercing is "[1]ike lightning . . . rare, severe, and unprincipled.
There is a consensus that the whole area of limited liability, and
conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most confusing
in corporate law. ' 62 Despite the fact that piercing seems to happen
"freakishly," these two commentators suggest that the doctrine, and
application of it by the courts, makes more sense than seems at first
63
glance:
The cases may be understood, at least roughly, as attempts to balance
the benefits of limited liability against its costs. Courts are more likely
to allow creditors to reach the assets of shareholders where limited
liability provides minimal gains from improved liquidity and
diversification, while creating a high probability that a firm will engage
64
in socially excessive level of risk taking.

Despite the ambiguity surrounding the application of the
piercing doctrine, several factors consistently influence decisions
where courts allow piercing of the corporate veil. The first factor is

57.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 7, at 60.
58.
Jay A. McKendree, Note, Appropriate Federal Rules of Veil Piercing in
Response to U.S. v. Cordous Chem. Co., 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 419, 434 (1998).
59.
PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:1.
60.
U.S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1905); see PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:1.
61.
PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:1.
62.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 89; see PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:1.
Professor Presser says in his treatise that "the doctrine is never likely to be pinned
down to rigged particulars, and that it will evolve and change as long as our conception
of... the corporation remain[s] changing." Id. § 1:2.
63
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 109 (stating that like lightning, veil
piercing is "rare, severe, and unprincipled").
64.
Id.
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''whether the [firm] followed formalities and kept adequate records of
its business."65 The idea behind this consideration is that recordkeeping formalities shed light on how shareholders conducted the
corporation at the time the cause of action arose. 6 6 The second factor
that often influences a court's decision is whether the corporation was
undercapitalized-which makes piercing of the veil more likely. 6 7 The
third factor that courts consider is whether an entity treats another
entity's assets as its own.68 This involves inquiring into whether
shareholders controlled and dominated the company. 69 Evidence of
commingling of funds or assets is often strong evidence showing that
a shareholder dominated the corporate entity.70 Finally, courts
inquire into whether the corporate form is used for illegitimate
purposes-for example, when the corporation is used to perpetrate a
fraud-or if failure to pierce would create an injustice. 71 Allegations
that the corporate entity is being used to perpetuate a fraud most
commonly arise in contract cases where representations were made
concerning the entity's financial status, relating to the entity's
performance, or indicating that someone besides the entity would
stand behind the debt.7 2 Allegations that the failure to pierce would
73
result in an injustice normally arise in the context of tort claims.
Judge Easterbrook notes that virtually every case in which a
74
court has pierced the corporate veil involved a close corporation.
This is supported by economic logic because limited liability does not
reduce monitoring costs in close corporations, 75 and the incentive for
managers to undertake overly risky projects is much more severe in
close corporations. 76 The other major category of veil piercing cases
involves parent-subsidiary combinations, where piercing the veil is
also supported by economic principles.7 7 "Allowing creditors to reach
the assets of parent corporations does not create unlimited liability
for any people . . . [so] the benefits of diversification, liquidity, and
monitoring by the capital market are unaffected. '78 Finally, courts

65.

Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercingfor All Limited Liability Entities:

Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 11213 (2001); see Epperson, supra note 50, at 612.

66.

Huss, supra note 65, at 113.

67.
68.

Id. at 114; see Epperson, supra note 50, at 613.
Huss, supra note 65, at 115.

69.
70.

Id.
Id.

71.

Id. at 112.

72.
Id.
Id.
73.
74.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 109.
75.
Investors in a close corporation are typically involved in managing the
corporation.
76.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 110.
77.
78.

Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 111.
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seem to be more willing to pierce the corporate veil when the
enterprise is undercapitalized.7 9 Again, this makes economic sense,
since "the lower the amount of [a] firm's capital, the greater the
incentive to engage in [overly] risky activities." 80 Further, "[a]llowing
creditors to look beyond the assets of the undercapitalized corporate
debtor provides the debtor with the incentive to disclose its situation
at the time of the transaction."'

III. CHINA: ITS

POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND COMPANY LAW

A. China'sEconomy
The Communist Party, led by Chairman Mao Zedong, declared
the formation of the People's Republic of China following the 1949
Revolution. 8 2 The Communist Party abolished free markets,
nationalized most private companies into state enterprises, and
implemented a centrally controlled economic system.8 3 Holding a
deep distrust of capitalism and western investors, the Party believed
that a planned economy would better maximize efficiency and
productivity.8 4 Every aspect of the economy was planned, and the
government engaged in both micro and macro economic planning.8 5 A

79.
Id. at 113.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Leontine D. Chuang, Comment, Investing in China's Telecommunications
Market: Reflections on the Rule of Law and Foreign Investment in China, 20 NW. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 509, 509 (2000); William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The
Inherent Conflict Between China's Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities
Market, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 477, 477 (2002).
83.
Friedman, supra note 82, at 477. Specifically, Mao brought banks and the
entire lending sector under direct control of the central government. Christopher M.
Vaughn, Venture Capital in China: Developing a Regulatory Framework, 16 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 227, 232 (2002). He abolished China's securities markets and eradicated the
wealthy lending class. Id.
84.
K. Matthew Wong, Securities Regulations in China and Their Corporate
Finance Implications on State Enterprise Reform, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221 (1996).
This followed the beliefs of Lenin, who held that competition was irrelevant to the
economic reality and also inherently condemned by enshrined communist ideology.
Youngjin Jung & Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in China:A Third Way for
Competition Regime?, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L & BUS. 107, 111 (2003). "The Chinese Marxists
theorized that . . . [a] planned economy would result in maximum productivity and
efficiency, since the entire population would be employed .
Friedman, supra note
82, at 477.
85.
Anna M. Han, China's Company Law: Practicing Capitalism in a
Transitional Economy, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 457, 462 (1996). Macro planning
included prioritizing industries which would receive materials and funds first. Id. at
462-63. Micro planning included the management of every aspect of economic
operation, including purchasing, production, quality control, and labor practices. Id. at
463.
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system of government control over everything, from the purchasing of
raw materials to the sale of goods, was implemented in state-owned
enterprises and collectively owned enterprises. 86 More specifically,
China engaged in "directive planning," where production units were
given specific targets to meet.8 7 Under this arrangement, the power
over the enterprises resided with various administrative organs and
88
the bureaucrats who worked for them.
This economic system resulted in numerous problems. First,
"[e]nterprises lacked the most basic decision making powers" because
all decisions were determined by the government's plan, as
interpreted by layers of bureaucracy.8 9 Second, the centralized system
provided no incentive for enterprises to be innovative and
profitable. 90 "[P]rofits were irrelevant since excess earnings were
turned over to the government."9 1 "The net effect of this system was
to encourage, across the economy as a whole, complacency and
92
resignation to the point of stagnation."
China emerged from its self-imposed economic isolation in 1978
when the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China adopted "a policy of economic reform and opened China to
increased contacts with the outside world. '93 At that time, China
made a historic decision "to convert its planned socialist/communist
economic system to a 'socialist economic structure with Chinese
characteristics.' 94 The new policy "center[ed] on economic reforms
[by] utilizing market mechanisms and foreign resources to speed
[China's] economic growth and modernization. '95 The economic
reforms centered around three main objectives: "(1) decentral[izing]
the economy, (2) bolster[ing] reliance on market forces and
...incentives as a means of achieving [productive] economic
behavior and [efficient] resource allocation, and (3) encourag[ing]
foreign investment. '96 "The essential aim [of the reforms] was the
devolution of economic decision making power from higher to lower
level governmental bodies and, in a few cases, the transfer of power

86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 463-64.
90.
Id. at 464.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: CorporatizingEnterprises and
the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62, 65
(1993). Commentators often refer to this as "the sleeping giant awakening." Id.
94.
Han, supra note 85, at 458.
95.
Friedman, supra note 82, at 478.
96.
Ann P. Vandevelde, Realizing the Re-Emergence of the Chinese Stock
Market: Fact or Fiction?, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 584 (1997).
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out of the bureaucratic hierarchy altogether and into the private
sector."

97

Since adopting this open door policy, China has experienced
rapid economic growth. 98 Its economic growth and modernization
began with the enactment of laws permitting foreign investment in
China in the form of joint ventures. 99 In 1982, China revamped its
constitution to recognize the rights of individual businesses and
private enterprise, though these rights were not clearly
articulated.100 Then in 1990, China established two national
securities exchanges to centralize and control its securities
markets.' 0 1 In 1992, the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) was created as the national regulatory body of the securities

97.
Wong, supra note 84, at 1226-27 (citing Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got
To Do With It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J.1, 3 (1991)). The Communist Party embarked on a strategy of corporatization and
securitization, with only limited privatization. Friedman, supra note 82, at 478.
Corporatization means the "conversion of state-owned enterprises into shareholding
companies," and securitization means the "sale of shares of state-owned enterprises in
the securities market." Id. Limited privatization refers to "minority private equity
participation in state-owned enterprises so as to enable the government to retain
majority control of the market." Id. The effect, then, was that the market would
continue to be susceptible to governmental control, while the private sector would be
encouraged to invest. Id.
98.
Kenneth Lieberthal & Geoffrey Lieberthal, The Great Transition, 2003
HARV. Bus. REV. 70, 72 (2003) (stating that China's annual real GDP has grown about
9% a year, on average, since 1978.) Further, foreign trade has grown, on average, by
15% a year, or more than 2,700% in aggregate. Id. "In 2002, China became the first
country [in nearly two decades] to attract more FDI in a year than the United States."
Id. Another interesting fact demonstrating China's economic progress: "four to six
million new cell phone subscribers are signing up every month." Id.
99.
The substantive reforms began with the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (JVL), which was the Chinese
government's first statute governing foreign investment. Chuang, supra note 82, at
511-12. The purpose of the JVL was to allow foreign companies to join Chinese
companies in establishing joint ventures that were in accordance with the principles of
equality and mutual benefit. Id. at 512. Joint ventures had to be approved by the
Chinese government, and it was understood that China did not plan to open its entire
economy to foreign investment. Id. at 511-12. Further reforms included amendments
to its constitution in 1982 which explicitly protected foreign investors "lawful rights
and interest in the People's Republic of China." Id. at 512.
100.
Michael Irl Nikkel, "Chinese Characteristics" in Corporate Clothing:
Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's Company Law, 80 MINN. L. REV. 503, 508
(1995). Nevertheless, these new provisions in the constitution "laid the foundation for
China's new conception of private ownership." Id. at 509.
101.
Friedman, supra note 82, at 486; Jay Zhe Zhang, Comment: Securities
Markets and Securities Regulation in China, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 557, 559
(1997);. The Shanghai Stock exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were
established within six months of each other. Wong, supra note 84, at 1222. Similar to
the New York Stock Exchange, these stock exchanges were meant to ensure the
maintenance of a fair and orderly marketplace. Friedman, supra note 82, at 487.
Initially, the two exchanges were regulated by local regulations that were slightly
different from each other-there was no uniform set of regulations. Id. at 486.
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market. 10 2 However, perhaps the most significant development in this
continuing series of economic legislation and reforms was the
10 3
promulgation of the Company Law.
B. The Company Law
Prior to 1994, China lacked a national, uniform legal framework
"that clearly established the rights and responsibilities of the
shareholders" and managers of companies. 10 4 This changed with the
adoption of the Company Law.1 0 5 The Company Law is recognized as
a key element in the process of economic reform that began in
1978.106 Its adoption of the concept of limited liability indicates that
the Chinese government recognizes the benefits of limited liability in
0 7
The law
encouraging capital formation and entrepreneurship.
serves four primary purposes: "(1) to restructure the organization and
management of state-owned enterprises; (2) to address . . . problems
of inefficiency; (3) to promote competition and productivity; and (4) to
remove the state from detailed management of business
operations."' 0 8 In short, it was enacted to help transform China's
socialist, planned economy "into a market-oriented system by shifting
the control of business organizations from government to private
citizens." 10 9 It provides a legal framework for the protection of both
foreign and domestic investors. 110 It "standardize[s] the organization

102.
Zhang, supra note 101, at 563. The CSRC eventually promulgated
comprehensive rules governing the exchanges. Id. For example, the rules defined
securities exchanges as non-profit organizations with a "legal person" status. Id. at
564. The rules mandated that the exchanges be governed by a board of directors, with
half the directors being elected by members of the exchange and the other half
appointed by the government. Id. The government's control over the securities market
greatly increased with the new rules. Id. at 565. The CSRC was granted even more
control over the exchanges. Id. The CSRC nominated the chairman and vice-chairman
of the board of directors, and the general manager and deputy general manager of each
exchange. Id. Further, the rules and procedures for the operations of the exchanges
had to be approved by the CSRC. Id. In effect, the CSRC was given the power to
exercise control over the daily operations of the exchanges. Id.
103.
Han, supra note 85, at 459. The Securities Law, enacted in 1999, is the
other major piece of legislation of particular significance.
104.
Wong, supra note 84, at 1232.
105.
Id. See The Company Law, supra note 5. The Law became effective on July
1, 1994. Wong, supra note 84, at 1232.
106.
Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation
Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273, 274 (1995).
107.
Chuan Roger Peng, Limited Liability in China: A Partial Reading of
China's Company Law of 1994, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 263, 279--80 (1994).
108.
Art & Gu, supra note 106, at 274-75.
109.
Anyuan Yuan, Foreign Direct Investments in China: PracticalProblems of
Complying with China's Company Law and Laws for Foreign-Invested Enterprises, 20
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 475, 476 (2000).
110.
Nikkel, supra note 100, at 522. At least one of the "purposes of the
Company Law is to reform existing state enterprises and to allow foreign investment in
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and conduct of companies [and] protect[s] the legitimate interests
of ... shareholders and creditors.""' Perhaps most significantly, it
expressly recognizes the legality of limited liability forms of business
organizations.112
Six aspects of the Company Law are worthy of discussion, as
they impact the later discussion of the veil piercing doctrine in China.
First, while modeled on Western corporation codes, the Law has
distinctly Chinese characteristics. Second, the Law recognizes limited
liability with respect to two corporate forms and requires corporations
to have a legal representative who can be held liable in certain
circumstances. Third, the stringent requirements for incorporation
mean that the government retains considerable control over who is
14
must
permitted to incorporate. 1 3 Fourth, a joint stock corporation
set up a supervisory committee comprised of shareholders and
employees.'1 5 Fifth, shareholders are well favored under the
Company Law-at least relative to shareholders in U.S.
corporations-in that they are given a considerable amount of power
over the management of the company. Sixth, the Law places
restrictions on distributions to shareholders.
While the distinct mission of the Company Law is to "meld the
organizational structure of Western capitalist business into a political
16
and economic regime that maintains socialist principles and goals,""
the law is modeled in significant part on U.S. and other Western
corporation codes. 117 For example, like most Western legal regimes,
the Company Law provides shareholders with limited liability,
preemptive rights, and the power to elect directors. 1 8 The Law also
permits the issuance of dividends 1 9 and imposes fiduciary duties on
directors. 120 However, despite the presence of these Western

these enterprises," but the law also reflects China's desire to develop its "domestic
underwriting industry and to prevent [] international securities firms from
monopolizing the underwriting process." Wong, supra note 84, at 1232.
111.
Yuan, supranote 109, at 476.
112.
See Peng, supra note 107, at 266.
113.
See generally Wong, supra note 84 (describing the history of the Company
Law and its requirements); Yuan, supra note 109 (describing the process of
incorporation).
114.
A joint stock corporation is also known as a "corporation limited by shares."
Wong, supra note 84, at 1233 n.79.
115.
In theory, the supervisory committee stands as an impediment to
management doing whatever it wants. However, it is not clear how much this
requirement really impinges on management's ability to act. The Company Law does
not further define the powers that the supervisory committee retains. See Yuan, supra
note 109, at 488-89.
116.
Art & Gu, supranote 106, at 273-74.
117.
Id. at 274.
118.
See The Company Law, supra note 5, at arts. 3, 38.
119.
See id. at art. 35.
120.
See id. at art. 123; see generally Nikkel, supra note 100 (discussing
questions of fiduciary duty in the Company Law).
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properties, the Law is distinctly Chinese in its attempt to meld these
Western ideas into the Chinese goal of promoting a socialist market
economy. 121 Western corporation codes are designed "to reduce
transaction costs by implying in every corporate charter the normal
rights that a shareholder could be expected to insist on, of which the
most important is the right to cast votes, equal to the number of
shares he holds, for membership on the corporate board of
directors."'122 This standardization of basic rights ensures that
investors will find it unnecessary to investigate what their rights will
be in every corporation. 123 As discussed above, this enables investors
to efficiently "reallocate their capital based more on the economic
value of the firm" rather than the bargain with management or other
125
investors. 124 In turn, stocks become a more fungible commodity.
In contrast, the Company Law was designed more as a
management tool. 1 26 The goal of the Company Law is not
privatization but corporatization. 127 Corporatization involves
"restructuring state enterprises, adopting the corporate form, and
instituting stock ownership and trading without necessarily
relinquishing the state's controlling interest."'128 Therefore, the
Chinese government often maintains a majority ownership interest in
129
state enterprises that it converts into the corporate form.
The concept of limited liability is applicable to corporations
governed by the Company Law. 13° The law creates two classes of

121.
122.

Art, supranote 106, at 275.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 452 (6th ed. 2003).

WILLIAM B. GAMBLE,
123.
REGULATORY RISK 150 (2002).
124.
Id.
125.
Id.

INVESTING

IN CHINA:

LEGAL,

FINANCIAL,

AND

126.
Id.
127.
Vandevelde, supra note 96, at 587. The fact that China is not seeking
privatization is reflected in Article 1 of the Company Law, which states as one of the
law's purposes the maintenance of "the socialist economic order" and the promotion of
"the development of the socialist market economy." The Company Law, supra note 5, at
art. 1. The Law regards corporations as "a necessary evil to be closely regulated rather
than an economic engine to be encouraged and released." Art & Gu, supra note 106, at
289.
128.
Art, supranote 106, at 283.
129.
Id.
130.
The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 3.
A company is an enterprise juridical person, which has independent juridical
person property and enjoys the property right of the juridical person. And it
shall bear the liabilities for its debts with all its property. As for a limited
liability company, the shareholders shall be responsible for the company to the
extent of the capital contributions they have paid. As for a joint stock limited
company, the shareholders shall be responsible for the company to the extent of
the shares they have subscribed to.
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stock companies: the limited liability company 131 and a company
limited by shares 132 (also known as a joint stock company). 133 The
limited liability company form is used by smaller corporations, which
134
are analogous to closely held corporations in the United States.
The shares of limited liability companies are not freely transferable,
so these companies do not participate in China's securities
markets. 135 A joint stock company is the company form used for
136
larger companies which are permitted to issue shares to the public.
Joint stock companies are governed by shareholders, a board of
directors, a supervisory board, and the executive management137
similar to the governance structure of companies limited by shares.
"[T]here is no nationality requirement for the shareholder of a joint
stock company," which reflects China's desire to attract foreign
capital and the reality that there was already a sizeable foreign
participation in the stock market before the Company Law was
promulgated. 13 8 However, there are some restrictions on foreign
nationals. For example, they are not permitted "to purchase 'A
shares,' which are common stocks issued [only] to Chinese residents
139
for domestic trading only."
Instead of setting up a corporation as a virtual person, the
Company Law requires each corporation to have a "legal
representative.1 140 Similar to an agent in U.S. corporate law, the
legal representative is the person authorized to act on behalf of the
company and to bind the company in a given matter. 4 1 The legal
representative is the Chairman of the Board of Directors or Chief

131.
The Chinese term for limited liability company is You Xian Ze Ren Gong Si.
Art, supra note 106, at 291.
132.
The Chinese term for a company limited by shares is his Gu Feng You Xian
Gong Si. Id.
133.
Zhang, supra note 101, at 566.
134.
Five of the main requirements to establish a limited liability company are:
(1) the limited liability company must not have more than fifty shareholders, (2) the
shareholders shall invest through capital contributions, (3) the articles of association
must be worked out jointly by the shareholders, (4) the company must have a domicile,
and (5) the name and organizational structure of the company complies with the
Company Law. The Company Law, supra note 5, at arts. 23, 24A.
135.
Zhang, supra note 101, at 566-67.
136.
Id. at 567. The requirements to establish a joint stock company are as
follows: (1) the company must have at least two but no more than two hundred
initiators; (2) the initiators must be able to raise the statutory minimum amount of
capital; (3) the issuance of shares must conform with the law; (4) the initiators must
formulate the articles of association, which are adopted at the establishment meeting;
(5) the name and organizational structure of the company conforms with the law; and
(6) the company has a domicile. The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 77.
137.
Zhang, supra note 101, at 567; see The Company Law, supra note 5, at arts.
102-28.
138.
Wong, supra note 84, at 1233.
139.
Id.
140.
GAMBLE, supra note 123, at 152.
141.
Art, supra note 106, at 294.
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Executive Officer, and he or she is subject to sanctions for the
corporation's misconduct. 142 Importantly, the concept of a legal
representative is an encroachment on limited liability. 143 Although
the representative is not personally liable for corporate debts, he or
she may be fined, subjected to administrative sanctions, or even
prosecuted if the corporation commits a crime. 144 One author
succinctly summed up the significance of the legal representative: "To
protect itself and its property, the government was willing to adopt
the concept of limited liability. However, when it put its property in
the hands of a steward, it wanted to be able to hold the steward
1 45
personally to account."'
While not arduous, the process of incorporation under the
Company Law is fairly stringent, relative to that of U.S.
jurisdictions. 146 This seems to serve one main purpose: to minimize
opportunities for fraud and abuse. 147 Such fears are not as readily
apparent in more advanced economies because businesses and
individuals are accustomed to protecting themselves. 148 The same
cannot be said of newly incorporated Chinese companies and their
investors. Therefore, by maintaining strict standards on who can
exercise the privilege of incorporating, the Chinese government may
be able to prevent, or at least reduce, instances of the use of the
corporate form for fraudulent purposes.
The Company Law also requires a joint stock company to set up
a supervisory committee-a requirement borrowed from the German
corporate code. 149 The committee must be comprised of at least three
persons and can include only shareholders and employees. 150 The
supervisory committee is supposed to act as a watchdog over the
board of directors, but the committee does not have extensive
powers. 15 1 Article 120 of the Company Law states that the committee

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
GAMBLE, supra note 123, at 152.
See The Company Law, supra note 5, at arts. 77-93.
Art, supra note 106, at 289.
Id. at 289, n.102.

The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 118 (stating that a "joint stock
149.
company shall set up a board of supervisors"); Yuan, supra note 109, at 488. Limited
liability companies are permitted to have supervisory committees, but they are not
required. The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 52 (stating that a "limited liability
company may set up a board of supervisors").
The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 118. The percentage of the
150.
representatives of the employees can account for no less than one third of all the
supervisors. Id. The employee representatives are democratically elected through the
meeting of representatives, shareholders' meeting, or by other means. Id.
GAMBLE, supra note 123, at 152.
151.
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must keep a record of its decisions, but no part of the law actually
1 52
says what types of decisions the committee should be making.
In the United States and most other Western jurisdictions, the
powers of the corporation are vested in the board of directors. 153 By
contrast, the Chinese Company Law says that "the shareholders'
meeting 154 of a limited liability company shall ... be the authority of
the company."' 155 Likewise, with respect to joint stock companies, the
Company Law says that "the shareholders' meeting . . . is the
156

company's organ of power."'
The specific powers granted to the shareholders' meeting are the
15 7
same for limited liability companies and joint stock companies.
Some of the powers are no different than what one would expect to
find in any Western corporation code. For example, the shareholders
have the power to elect directors and revise the articles of
incorporation. 1 58 However, the Company Law also gives shareholders
additional powers that are atypical of those found in Western
corporation codes. They have the authority to: determine the
company's operation guidelines and investment plans; deliberate and
approve annual financial budget plans and final account plans of the
company; make resolutions on the increase or decrease of the
company's registered capital; make resolutions on the issuance of
corporate bonds; and adopt resolutions on the assignment, split-up,
change of company form, dissolution, and liquidation of the
company. 159 In sum, the shareholders are given considerable
authority over the management of the company. 160 This list of powers
demonstrates that shareholders can decide on policies regarding
business operations, determine investment plans, and examine and
approve plans for the company's profit distribution and strategy to
16 1
deal with losses.
Further, shareholders are permitted to exercise their powers
more than once a year. Article 40 permits regular meetings and

152.
The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 120; see generally The Company
Law, supra note 5.
153.
GAMBLE, supra note 123, at 152.
154.
A shareholders' meeting for both limited liability companies and joint stock
companies comprises all the shareholders. The Company Law, supra note 5, at arts. 37,
99.
155.
Id. at art. 37.
156.
Id. at art. 99.
157.
Id. at art. 100 ("The provisions regarding the authorities of the
shareholders' meeting of a limited liability company as prescribed in the first
paragraph of Article 38 of this law shall apply to the shareholders' meeting of a joint
stock company.").
158.
Id. at art. 38.
159.
Id.

153.

160.

GAMBLE, supra note 123, at 153.

161.

The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 38; see GAMBLE, supra note 123, at
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temporary meetings. 162 While regular meetings are held pursuant to
the Articles of Association, temporary meetings can be held whenever
shareholders representing 10% or more of the voting rights propose
such a meeting.163
The amount of authority delegated to shareholders is not
surprising considering that the Chinese government is the largest
shareholder in most of the largest enterprises. 164 By delegating such
authority to the shareholders, the government can still manage a
corporation de facto.
"Another unique provision of the Company Law [requires
corporations to] set aside a portion of [their] profits in a reserve fund
until the fund equals [50%] of the company's capital. '165 This
paternalistic restriction is designed to protect China's inexperienced
shareholders-a category into which most Chinese shareholders
fall. 16 6 While the requirement perhaps stabilizes dividends and
reduces the chance of bankruptcy, it also reduces management's
ability to reinvest profits and infringes on management's right to
deploy financial resources. 167 The reserve fund requirement has a
particularly strong effect on converted state
enterprises-state
enterprises generally have a large capital base, but the reserve fund
requirement prevents these converted companies from paying out
168
significant dividends, at least for the first few years.
C. Piercingthe Veil in China
The Company Law did not recognize the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil when it was enacted in 1994. Nor was the doctrine
recognized in the 1999 or 2004 amendments to the Law. However,
corporate veil piercing was finally recognized in the most recent
amendment to the Company Law, which became effective in 2006.169
The 2006 amendment did not introduce an entirely foreign
concept into Chinese law; Chinese courts had pierced the corporate
veil prior to 2006. Prior to the latest version of the Company Law, the
primary authority for piercing the corporate veil in China was found
in a 1994 Chinese Supreme Court document responding to a question
presented by the Higher People's Court of Guangdong. 170 The

162.
The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 40.
163.
Id. at arts. 40, 101.
164.
See GAMBLE, supra note 123, at 153 (stating that the government is the
majority shareholder of virtually all companies listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange).
165.
Wong, supra note 84, at 1234.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
See The Company Law, supra note 5.
170.
Albert, supra note 8, at 882.
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document discussed a situation in which one enterprise established a
company, and the established company eventually went out of
business. 171 The Chinese Supreme Court stated in the document that
if the assets of the bankrupt company are not sufficient to satisfy the
debts, "then the enterprise that established the company will assume
civil liability to the extent that the amount of registered capital of
[the bankrupt] company exceeds the actual capital contribution made
to it."'1 72 In addition, if no capital was contributed to the bankrupt
company, "or the amount was not sufficient according to law, then the
[establishing] company" would assume the full civil liability of the
173
bankrupt company.
The main criticism of the document is that the situation it
contemplates is too narrowly tailored. 174 It seemingly permits veil
piercing only in limited circumstances involving undercapitalization
or improper registration. 175 Further, it fails to provide any guidance
for cases in which the piercing doctrine might be applied to other
176
abuses of the corporate entity.
Chinese court opinions show that courts were willing to pierce
the corporate veil but only in the most limited circumstances, and the
doctrine was inconsistently applied. 177 For example, in one case, the
Chinese Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's "decision to pierce [a
corporation's] veil ... when it was [discovered] that the company was
really an instrument of the government and did not have any
invested capital.' 178 In another case, the Chinese Supreme Court
found that a state-owned enterprise, which was a minority
shareholder in a company, was liable for the debts of the company
because the state-owned enterprise was "liable for the wrongdoing
1 79
and had made no capital contribution.'

171.
Id. at 883.
172.
Id.
173.
Id. In addition, if "the facts show that a company did not meet the
[requisite] conditions for registration as a legal person," the document states that the
People's Court may choose to disregard the legal person status of the enterprise. Id.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 884.
178.
Id. at 885 ("In addition, the court found that the assets of this company
were moved to another company (established by the same government office) just
before a judgment on behalf of the creditor was to be executed.").
179.
Id. Another case is also noteworthy. In Rosin Factory of Wuzhou v.
Huajian, "the court found that the defendant company was nothing more than 'a shell
company with no capital, no site for operations and no ability to perform contracts' and
that it did not meet the conditions for a limited liability company." Id. The court held
the company is "liable for the amount owed to the plaintiff." Id. at 886. However, the
company's investor and legal representative were nowhere to be found, so the court
placed liability on the commission which improperly verified the information on the
defendant's business application. Id.
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Therefore, the doctrine of veil piercing was utilized, albeit in the
narrowest of circumstances. Several factors stood in the way of the
doctrine's proper usage. The interference of local Communist Party
branches slowed proceedings and made the collection of evidence
difficult, inexperienced judges did not know how to apply the
doctrine, and the tendency to protect local companies mitigated
efforts to utilize the doctrine.1 80 Also, the inability of judges to enforce
their decisions weakened the judiciary as a whole.' 8 ' Finally, as
discussed below, China's civil law system severely constricts the
power of the judiciary, and therefore, only statutory recognition of the
doctrine could lend the requisite credibility to make the doctrine
meaningful.
The Company Law was amended for a third time and adopted at
the Eighteenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on
October 27, 2005.182 Among other additions and revisions,18 3 the
amendment added a provision explicitly permitting courts to pierce
the corporate veil.' 8 4 The provision states:
Where any of the shareholders of a company evades the payment of its
debts by abusing the independent status of juridical person or the
shareholder's limited liabilities, and thus seriously damages the
interests of any creditor, it shall bear joint liabilities for the debts of the
company. 185

Codifying the corporate veil piercing doctrine is a necessary step
if the doctrine is to have significance in China's corporate law. The
primary reason that such prescription is necessary is that China has
a civil law legal system, which means there is a pronounced bias in
favor of positive, statutory law, as opposed to judicially articulated
case law and jurisprudence. 186 Whereas in a common law legal
system (such as the United States and Great Britain) the doctrine of
veil piercing may be elaborated almost exclusively in court opinions,

180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 886-87.
182.
China's New Company Law is Coming, PINSENT MASONS UPDATE, Nov.
2005, available at http://www.pinsentmasons.com/media/1411543471.pdf.
183.
Among the other additions and revisions are: lower incorporation threshold;
removal of the cap on outward investment; permission to form one-person limited
liability companies; improved corporate governance provisions, such as new restrictions
on the Chairman of the board of directors and the delegation of more power to the
board of supervisors; and increased protections for shareholders, such as the right to
check the company's account books and the right to have shares repurchased by the
company. Id.
184.
Id.
185.
The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 20.
186.
Nicholas C. Howson, Professor, Cornell L. Sch., Regulation of Companies
with Publicly Listed Share Capital in the People's Republic of China, Speech to the
International Seminar on Amendment of the PRC Company Law (Oct. 10-12, 2004), in
38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 237, 242-43 (2005).
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in China the doctrine must be codified in a formal statute or
regulation and then invoked by a court in arriving at a decision. 187
Further background on China's legal system will demonstrate
the importance of statutory law. Under China's constitutional
framework, the courts are "under the 'supervision"' of the
legislature. 188 China views legislation from the central and locallevel governments as well as administrative regulations as the sole
sources of law, and it permits only the legislative or administrative
body that promulgated a rule to interpret it. 189 Further, judicial
decisions have no precedential value, although courts deciding later
cases may use an earlier decision as a reference. 190
The basic power to interpret legislation is divided between the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the
State Council, with only limited roles assigned to the Supreme
People's Court. 19 1 "The People's Court has been given only the power
to interpret problems of the concrete application of laws or
regulations in the course of litigation;"' 92 it may not invalidate any
93
laws.1
Viewed in the abstract, codification may not be the best approach
to developing a veil piercing doctrine. Professor Thompson
persuasively argues that the doctrine should be left to develop at
common law. 1 94 With common law, "[]ines are drawn by judges after
the fact," whereas with statutory law, the lines are drawn by

187.
Id. at 243. Another example is the concept of fiduciary duty. Id.
188.
STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO
281 (1999); Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial Reform,
4 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 255, 275 (2003).
189.
LUBMAN, supra note 188, at 282. China's adherence to this position leaves
no room for courts to exercise interpretive powers. Id. "Economic reforms, however, are
generating pressures on the courts to depart from these doctrines, and the Supreme
People's Court is engaged in an effort to promote the coherence of promulgated laws
and to provide guidance to a judicial hierarchy whose authority is badly splintered." Id.
In addition, legislatures generally have very little incentive to interpret the law, so
citizens are often left in a quandary with no legal recourse. Lin, supra note 188, at 275
("When citizens that suffer injustice complain to the legislature, or pursuant to the
Law on Legislation to the particular government agency in charge of a particular law's
implementation, they will likely meet indifference and delays.").
190.
LUBMAN, supra note 188, at 282. Chinese doctrine firmly denies any
binding force to judicial decisions. Id. at 284. Published court opinions "may be
considered instructive examples, but they are not supposed to be considered a source of
law." Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme People's Court has been publishing selected
opinions, and some scholars argue that the court intends for these publications to carry
the same weight as precedent. Id. at 285. In addition, a "growing number" of Chinese
legal scholars believe that such opinions should be treated as precedent. Id. The
published cases will "guide the courts and create legal norms ..
thereby filling many
of the gaps in Chinese Law." Id.
191.
Id. at 282.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Thompson, supra note 6, at 623.
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"legislators before the fact."'19 5 Basing his argument on the U.S.
approach, 196 Professor Thompson argues that an "internal logic"
develops with both fairness and predictability as cases articulate
general rules. 197 "[T]he common law permits the law to adapt to
changes in circumstances in order to maintain the appropriate
equilibrium between the law and the social norms in which it is
embedded."' 98 The common law changes incrementally, permitting
adaptation to such change without "undermining the legitimacy of
the rule of law."' 99 In a setting where private planning is accorded a
"first mover advantage," the common law has particular advantage
because "private planning will [almost] inevitably devise new
schemes [to] avoid a particular legal rule. ' 20 0 Since judicial decisions
permit the law "to continuously define the boundaries in a way that
legislation [can]not," 20 1 the common law is more adept at responding
to such schemes. 20 2 He explains that "[tlhe common law is modest in
that it recognizes that not all knowledge comes at once, such that the
process is necessarily experimental and a particular result may be
provisional, subject to review if conflicting evidence is presented in a
'20 3
subsequent case.
However, barring momentous changes to China's legal system,
any piercing doctrine must necessarily be developed by statutory
law. 20 4 This is not to say, however, that codifying the doctrine will be
without its advantages over a doctrine developed at common law.
Some of the colorful descriptions of the common law veil piercing
doctrine have already been noted.20 5 Codifying the doctrine, rather
than leaving it to the courts to develop, may make it possible for

195.
Id.
196.
Professor Thompson defines the U.S. approach as "permitting private
parties the first move in setting up a separate corporation and asking courts to
disregard the separate entity in appropriate circumstances." Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
202.

Id.; see WORMSER, supra note 9, at 38.

Corporate law, in particular, develops so rapidly that such a formulation would
be stale even before the date of its publication. The law moves. It must be
moulded [sic] carefully to meet the ever changing needs of the present hour. It
must not be placed in a strait-jacket. Those who would codify it fail to
understand the spirit and genius which underlie it ....
The best way to handle
the problem is through the orderly and timely development and evolution of the
common law pursuant to the established judicial methods and legal processes
of over a thousand years. May we be preserved from statutory interference!
Id.
203.
204.
205.

Thompson, supra note 6, at 623.
See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1, 62.
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China to avoid some of the ambiguity that has plagued the doctrine
when it has been permitted to develop at common law.
The ambiguity plaguing veil piercing in common law
jurisdictions centers on two areas. First, courts often "reason by
pejorative. '20 6 For example, courts often justify their decision to
pierce the corporate veil by saying that the corporation was a mere
"sham" or "shell," or was the defendant's "alter ego." 20 7 To say the
least, these terms are unhelpful. They describe the result (that the
corporate veil is pierced), but they do little to explain the reasons for
the decision. 208 Words like sham and shell convey a lack of substance
to the corporation, but to the extent that this refers to a lack of
capitalization, it would be clearer to simply state that the corporation
was undercapitalized. 20 9 In addition, these terms often lead to a
"search [of] the defendant's purpose for establishing the corporation,"
which implies that establishing a corporation in order to avoid
personal liability is somehow disingenuous. 210 This cannot be correct,
since most corporations only exist for the purpose of extending
211
limited liability to the owners.
Second, the multi-factor approach utilized by courts leads to
indeterminacy.2 12 How many of the factors must be present before it
is permissible to pierce? The opinions provide little guidance, and
over time the list of factors tends to grow. 2 13 Invoking multiple
factors, without any real guidance as to how much weight to accord
each factor or the factors collectively, serves only to confuse those who
look to a case for precedent. 214 Judges often resort to metaphors to
aid understanding, 2 15 the result being that there are "hundreds of

206.
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of
Confusion Surroundingthe Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853,
855 (1997).
207.
Id.
208.
Thompson, supra note 6, at 624.
209.
Gevurtz, supra note 206, at 855.
210.
Id.
211.

Id.

212.
Id. at 857. Several factors often cited by the courts are: undercapitalization,
failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, use of corporate
funds for personal purposes, and absence of corporate records. Id. at 856-57.
213.
Thompson, supra note 6, at 624.
214.
Gevurtz, supra note 206, at 858. Professor Thompson notes that Judge
Posner has been "critical of a multi-factor judicial approach to the debt-equity
distinction in tax law." Thompson, supra note 6, at 624-25. Judge Posner "argued that
the multi-factor approach over time is non-directive, with no indication as to how to
weigh the various factors, which in turn 'invites the making of arbitrary decisions
based on uncanalized discretion or unprincipled rules of thumb."' Id. at 625. But see id.
(stating that Congress has never defined securities fraud, and instead has left it to
judicial development, because a "more specific definition will provide a roadmap for
fraud as planners devote their energy to schemes that are within the spirit of the law
but cleverly fall outside the proscribed definition").
215.
Thompson, supra note 6, at 624.
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'216
decisions that are irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible.
In addition, simply listing factors and evaluating their fulfillment or
lack thereof escapes any analysis based on policy or the underlying
principles of the doctrine. 217 There is rarely any analysis in the
decisions about why a particular factor should influence a decision
about whether or not to pierce the veil. 2 18 Instead, there tends to be
blind adherence to the idea that if a certain factor or collection of
219
factors is present, then the corporate veil should be pierced.
In sum, the advantages of permitting the piercing doctrine to
develop at common law are balanced against some disadvantages,
though the balance may not be perfect. As another commentator
noted, "A description of the various 'rules' relating to the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is difficult to define because of the
seemingly random manner in which courts have applied the
doctrine. '220 The same commentator argues that the veil piercing
doctrine has become so flawed that it is time to reconsider the use of
the common law concept entirely. 221 She proposes that legislatures
codify the best aspects of corporate veil piercing doctrine, in order to
222
provide courts with a framework to apply the doctrine consistently.

IV.

REFINING CHINA'S STATUTORY VEIL PIERCING DOCTRINE

When it considered an amendment to the Company Law to add a
veil piercing doctrine, the task before the NPC was to design a
provision that provided courts with enough direction so that they
could apply the doctrine effectively and uniformly while still leaving
the courts nominal discretion so that entrepreneurs could not simply
devise ways to avoid the rule. 223 Unfortunately, the veil piercing
provision in the Company Law falls short of this goal. As presently
constituted, the Company Law permits veil piercing when a
shareholder abuses the corporate form in order to evade the payment
224
of debts, thereby causing damage to the interests of creditors.
However, the provision fails to specify what conduct amounts to an

216.
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983).

217.
Gevurtz, supra note 206, at 857.
218.
See Thompson, supra note 6, at 624 ("Judges find the list more available
and accessible than the underlying principles.").
219.
Gevurtz, supra note 206, at 856.
220.
Huss, supra note 65, at 109.
221.
222.

Id. at 96.
Id.

223.
224.

See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 20.
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abuse of the corporate form. 225 Indeed, the statute points to no factors
that the courts should consider in their analyses. The provision is
deficient because it lacks the specificity mandated by China's civil law
system.
Given the limited ability of Chinese courts to interpret statutory
law and the inability to develop common law, it is imperative that the
Company Law be explicit about when it is appropriate to pierce the
corporate veil. In other words, the NPC must provide clear standards
for courts to follow in deciding whether or not to pierce. Importantly,
though, the standards need not be perfectly precise: the NPC has
permitted the courts to interpret laws at the margin as long as the
22 6
interpretation does not amount to law-making.
This Note advances two suggestions that would make the veil
piercing provision a more effective element of China's corporate law.
First, the provision should distinguish between two situations which
will confront the courts: one in which piercing would result in
reaching another corporation (parent-subsidiary context) and one in
which piercing would result in reaching an individual shareholder or
shareholders (the human context). 22 7 Second, the provision should
distinguish between tort and contract creditors, as economic
considerations impact how each of these creditors is viewed.
A. DistinguishingBetween the Parent-SubsidiaryContext and the
Human Context
The parent-subsidiary context and the human context present
unique circumstances and facts that often require a court to perform
different inquiries. Empirical evidence from U.S. jurisdictions
supports the statement that the two contexts should be examined

225.
See id. at art. 20 (failing to reference what conduct constitutes an abuse of
the corporate form).
226.
See LUBMAN, supra note 188, at 282 (noting that the Court may "clarify[ ]
and strengthen[ I the laws without changing their original meaning.").
227.
Professor Thompson notes in his empirical study of veil piercing that in his
data set piercing "did not occur in a publicly held corporation." Thompson, supra note
2, at 1047. He argues that courts refuse to pierce the veil of such corporations because
the "market-related benefits of limited liability are sufficient to prevail over all possible
claims of those who have claims against the public corporation and cannot collect from
its assets." Id. at 1048. The same arguably holds true for Chinese corporations which
are publicly held. Therefore, in the human shareholder context, we would expect to see
piercing to occur only with respect to limited liability companies, as opposed to joint
stock companies. Limited liability companies are comparable to close corporations in
the United States, whereas joint stock companies are permitted to have shares that
trade publicly. However, it is probably unnecessary to explicitly limit the doctrine to
limited liability companies since it is unlikely that the actions of the shareholders of a
joint stock company would meet the elements of the test, discussed infra p. 32.
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differently. 228 It is not surprising, then, that many U.S. jurisdictions
have done just that.
Formulating a provision that provides Chinese courts with
defined standards to follow in each of the two contexts is no easy task.
The fact that U.S. courts have been unable, after nearly a century of
decisions and scholarly endeavors, to develop a single test for each
context and apply it consistently is persuasive proof of the
difficulty. 229 Therefore, the guidelines that the Author suggests for
each context are merely that-a suggestion. Arguments could be
made that the guidelines are not specific enough or, on the other side,
are too constraining. Likewise, persuasive arguments could be made
that certain factors should be included and other factors excluded.
The goal is that each of the guidelines is supported by persuasive
economic and legal reasons but in any case that they will spur
additional thought and research into how China can develop a more
comprehensive and effective veil piercing provision.
With respect to the parent-subsidiary context, the veil piercing
provision should include a bifurcated test.23 0 These two tests are: (1)
the instrumentality test, and (2) the fraud test. The instrumentality
test requires that the subsidiary be completely under the control and
domination of the parent. 23 ' The fraud test requires that the parent's
conduct in using the subsidiary be unjust, fraudulent, or wrongful
23 2
toward the plaintiff.
The first part of the test examines the parent corporation's
relationship with the subsidiary. The mere fact that a corporation is
the sole shareholder of another corporation is insufficient to permit a
court to pierce the veil. 233 In fact, many large corporations have tens
or even hundreds of subsidiaries. The instrumentality test inquires
whether "a [subsidiary] corporation is so organized and controlled and
its affairs are so conducted as to make it a mere instrumentality or
agent ... of [the parent] corporation [such that] its separate existence
as a distinct corporate entity will be ignored. '2 34 In other words, the
subsidiary has no autonomy and the parent, though in form acting
through the subsidiary, "is operating the business directly for itself."
In determining whether the parent and subsidiary are so closely

228.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 110-11 (stating that courts are
more willing to pierce when the shareholder is a corporation as opposed to a human).
But see Thompson, supra note 2, at 1056 (stating that empirical evidence shows that
courts are more willing to pierce the corporate veil when the shareholder is a human
than when the shareholder is another corporation).
229.
See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
230.
Meaning that both parts of the test must be satisfied before the corporate
veil can be pierced.
231.

PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:6.

232.

Id.

233.

WORMSER, supra note 9, at 55-56.

234.

Id. at 54.
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connected that they are really one entity, and therefore the corporate
veil of the subsidiary should be disregarded, the court should consider
235
several questions:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Does the parent own all or most of the stock of the subsidiary?
Do the parent and subsidiary corporations have common
directors or officers?
Does the subsidiary have grossly inadequate capital?
Does the parent use the property of the subsidiary as its own?
Do the directors or officers fail to act independently in the
interest of the subsidiary, instead taking orders from the
parent?

All of these questions need not be answered in the affirmative in
order to find that the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality or agent of
the parent. 23 6 Rather, the requisite level of control can be inferred
237
even if only a few of the criteria are met.
The second part of the bifurcated test (the fraud test) recognizes
that piercing is appropriate only if the parent uses the subsidiary in a
way that harms the plaintiff creditor. In deciding whether this test is
2 38
fulfilled, the court should consider the following questions:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Did the parent use the subsidiary to commit a crime or violate a
statute?
Did the parent strip the subsidiary of its assets, leaving no
assets for the subsidiary's creditors?
Did the parent use the subsidiary to engage in
misrepresentation?
Did the parent use the subsidiary to commit a tort?

An affirmative answer to any of these questions would be sufficient to
satisfy the fraud test.
This bifurcated test-including the instrumentality and fraud
tests-provides relatively clear guidelines to the courts as to what
they should consider in deciding piercing cases and therefore
conforms to the structure of China's judicial system. However, it also
permits the courts some discretion (at the margins) in applying the
doctrine. The test is rigid enough to give the courts a clear direction
but flexible enough so that enterprising corporations cannot easily
devise a scheme to get around it.
With respect to the human context, and similar to the parentsubsidiary context, the veil piercing provision should define the
factors that a court must consider in deciding whether or not to

235.
236.
237.
238.

PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pierce. Several factors often figure prominently in U.S. veil piercing
cases: undercapitalization, fraud, commingling of assets, total
domination, failure to follow corporate formalities, and diversion of
funds or assets for non-corporate purposes. 239 However, simply listing
these factors in China's veil piercing provision will not be helpful to
the courts for the reasons already discussed. For example, U.S. courts
often list the failure to follow corporate formalities as a major factor
in piercing decision. 240 However, "failure to follow formalities" seems
to be a general phrase which encompasses more specific actions:
failure to issue stock, failure to have shareholder meetings to elect
directors or prepare minutes of such meetings, and failure to approve
or document transactions between the corporation and its
shareholders. 24 1 Listing these actions simply as a "failure to follow
formalities" obviates the real issue. The failure to issue stock may
prejudice creditors, and if so, it is because the firm is
undercapitalized. 242 Listing the failure to approve or document
transactions between the corporation or its owner also distracts from
the real issue, which is whether the shareholder is engaging in selfdealing. 243 Also, the argument that the failure to hold shareholders
meetings and keep minutes should lead to piercing is that if the
shareholder does not respect the corporation, then the court should
not either. 244 This argument, however, "substitutes rhetoric for
policy. '245 In addition, the observance of meeting formalities would
probably be immaterial to reasonable creditors. 246 Finally, fraud is
often mentioned as a reason to pierce the corporate veil. 247 Simply
saying that there was fraud, however, does little to explain the
misconduct. Like failure to follow corporate formalities, it seems to be
no more than a catch-all term which includes undercapitalization,
self-dealing, and abusive dealings with the creditor.
The suggested guidelines for the human context, discussed
below, seek to avoid general terms that actually encompass more
specific conduct. They also seek to avoid the two main sources of
ambiguity about veil piercing in common law jurisdictions-reasoning
by pejorative and listing multiple factors without exploring the
reasons why the factors contribute to a piercing decision. The
provision in the Company Law should state three factors that should

239.
See Mark A. Olthoff, Beyond the Form - Should the Corporate Veil be
Pierced?, 64 UMKC L. REV. 311, 313-14 (1995) (listing factors that courts commonly
rely upon when deciding whether or not to pierce the corporate veil).
240.
Guvertz, supra note 206, at 866.
241.
Id. at 867.
242.
Id. at 867-68.
243.
Id. at 868.
244.
Id.
245.
Id.
246.
Id. at 869.
247.

Id. at 871.
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be considered in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil:
undercapitalization, abusive dealings with the corporation's assets,
and abusive dealings with the plaintiff creditor. Like the first part of
the parent-subsidiary guidelines (the instrumentality test), all three
factors need not be present in order to pierce. In fact, in most
instances the satisfaction of only one factor should be sufficient to
justify a decision to pierce.
In the United States, undercapitalization is one of the most often
cited reasons for piercing the corporate veil.248 If the shareholders

knowingly contribute too little capital to the corporation to meet the
expected liabilities of the business, they are engaging in abuse of the
corporate form. 24 9 In addition, a corporation has a greater incentive

to engage in excessively risky activities the lower the amount of its
capital. 250 Under the Company Law, a limited liability company is
required to have a minimum amount of registered capital of 30,000
Yuan. 251 In addition, the amount of initial capital contributions made
by all investors to a limited liability company is required to be not
less than 20% of the total registered capital, and the remaining
amount must be paid off within two years of the establishment of the
company.2 52 These provisions of the Company Law can provide
benchmarks for whether a corporation is undercapitalized, although
proof that a corporation meets these statutory minimums does not
necessarily mean that the firm is not undercapitalized. 2 53 However,
the courts must be able to point to some standard to determine
whether a firm is undercapitalized, and these benchmarks present
clear standards. Less defined standards would risk plaguing the

248.
Thompson, supra note 6, at 629. But see id. (stating that
undercapitalization is not among the factors most likely to lead to piercing).
249.
PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:9.
250.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 7, at 59.
251.
The Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 26. RMB 30,000 Yuan is equal to
about $3700. See Exchange Rate Home Page, http://www.exchangerate.com/
200plus.calculator.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2006) (calculating the conversion of
Yuan to U.S. dollars). The minimum amount of registered capital of a joint stock
company is RMB 5 million Yuan, equal to about $615,000. The Company Law at art.
81; see Exchange Rate Home Page,
http://www.exchangerate.com/200pluscalculator.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2006) (calculating the conversion of Yuan to U.S.
dollars).
252.
The Company Law, supra note 5, at arts. 26, 81.
253.
In Germany, undercapitalization can exist in two forms: nominal or
material undercapitalization. PRESSER, supra note 3, § 5:5. Like China (but unlike
American jurisdictions), Germany has a minimum capital requirement for corporations
and limited liability companies. Id. When the minimum capital requirement is not met,
nominal undercapitalization occurs. Id. However, the statutory minimum "does not
assure that a business will have adequate capital in order to meet its obligations." Id.
Therefore, "material undercapitalization refers to situations in which the statutory
minimum requirement is satisfied, but the owners fail to invest a sufficient amount of
capital in the business." Id. It is still unclear, though, the extent to which German
courts will pierce the corporate veil because of material undercapitalization. Id.
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courts with the same ambiguity and inconsistency that have
dominated in U.S. jurisdictions. Since the statutory minimums set a
relatively low bar for capitalization, proof that a firm is not
undercapitalized should not be determinative of whether the
corporate veil should be pierced on its own. Further,
undercapitalization should not only be measured at the beginning of
the
corporation's
life. 254
As
Professor Thompson
notes,
"[u]ndercapitalization . . .is most troublesome when it reflects a
unilateral change by those in control of the corporation to deprive the
creditors of their reasonable expectations of repayment. '255 Therefore,
the courts should judge undercapitalization at the time the contract
was executed or the tort occurred.
The second factor that courts should consider when determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil to reach an individual under the
Company Law is whether there have been abusive dealings with the
corporation's assets. Courts often use words like "commingling" or
"siphoning" to describe situations in which a shareholder is selfdealing. 25 6 Self-dealing refers to a shareholder putting corporate
assets to personal uses, and underlying policy supports the relevance
of self-dealing as a factor in piercing decisions. In the context of
contract creditors, implied (if not explicit) in any credit agreement is
a promise by the corporation that the shareholders will not be free to
do whatever they want with the corporate assets. 257 If such a promise
were not implied, the controlling shareholder could raid the
corporation of its money and leave the creditor unpaid.2 58 Further,
siphoning assets out of the corporation so that insufficient funds will
259
be available to pay debts changes the expectations of the parties.
Likewise, in the context of tort creditors, if the controlling
shareholder can misappropriate corporate assets to personal uses
before tort victims can get or enforce a judgment. This leaves the
corporation with less incentive to insure, and the goal of internalizing
the costs of accidents is not met.260 Therefore, courts should pierce
the corporate veil when shareholders have been self-dealing.
Finally, courts should ask whether there have been abusive
dealings with a plaintiff creditor. Sometimes referred to as fraud, this
factor includes: false representations made by the shareholder to the

254. Thompson, supra note 6, at 630.
255. Id.
256. Gevurtz, supra note 206, at 875.
257. Id. at 875. This promise does not apply, of course, if the creditor, aware of
conduct that might constitute self-dealing, nevertheless chooses to do business with the
corporation. Id. at 876.
258.

Id. at 875.

259. Thompson, supra note 6, at 628.
260. Gevurtz, supra note 206, at 876. Further, there is less incentive to make
sure the costs of the corporation's goods or services fully reflect the likely costs of
accidents. Id.
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creditor about the corporation's financial status, the shareholder's
promises relating to corporate performance, and representations by
the shareholder that lead the creditor to believe that someone other
than the corporation stands behind the debt. 261 Deliberate deception
by a shareholder about the financial health of the corporation is clear
grounds for shareholder liability. 262 Likewise, it is fraud for a
controlling shareholder to promise certain corporate performance
when, "at the time of the promise, the . . . shareholder intended to
have the [corporation] default. '2 6 3 The final situation in which fraud
typically arises is when a shareholder casts oral assurances as a
personal guarantee that the debt will be paid. 264 Often such
comments are too vague or ambiguous to establish a contract, 26 5 but
if the creditor acted on such assurances, then there is a strong
argument that the creditor was defrauded. These three examples
represent instances in which wrongful conduct by the shareholder
changes the bargain made by the parties, therefore justifying piercing
266
the corporate veil.
B. DistinguishingBetween Tort and Contract Creditors
U.S. "courts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in
tort than in contract cases." 267 The distinction between tort
(involuntary) and contract (voluntary) creditors follows from a moral
hazard problem: "insiders in a . . . corporation can transfer costs of
accidents to those who deal with the corporation. '268 Further,
"contract creditors have the opportunity to investigate their corporate
debtors, and thus they can take account of the risk posed by limited
liability, and adjust their interest rates accordingly. '2 69 Tort
creditors, on the other hand, do not have the opportunity to
investigate the tortfeasor before the tort is committed. Therefore, the

261.
Id. at 871-73. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 112 ("In all
these situations, creditors are unable to assess the risk of default accurately and thus
the probability that the firm will engage in excessively risky activities is increased.").
262.
Gevurtz, supra note 206, at 871. It should also be noted that few courts, if
any, will be willing to pierce based on inadequate capitalization when the creditor was
fully informed of the corporation's weak financial health and yet still chose to do
business with the corporation. Id. at 872.
263.
Id. However, the mere fact that a corporation does not perform does not
turn the promise into fraud. Fraud requires that the speaker have never intended to
perform. Id.
264.
Id. at 873.
265.
Id. at 874.
266.
Id. at 871-73; Thompson, supra note 6, at 629.
267.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 112; but see Thompson, supra note
2, at 1068-69 (stating that his empirical study found a smaller percentage of tort cases
than contract cases in which the court pierced the veil).
268.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 112; Thompson, supra note 2, at
1068.
269.
PRESSER, supra note 3, § 1:10.
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veil piercing provision should provide that the guidelines should be
applied more often to tort creditors than to contract creditors. Said
differently, it should be easier for a tort creditor to reach the assets of
a shareholder than for a contract creditor.

V.

CONCLUSION

Veil piercing is an important doctrine in corporate law because it
deters abuse of the corporate form. It also decreases the incentive
created by limited liability to engage in overly risky activities. While
China has taken an important step in its corporate law by codifying
the doctrine in the Company Law, it has not gone far enough in
defining the standards that courts should use when determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil. The Company Law should
distinguish between situations where piercing would reach another
corporation and where piercing would reach an individual. Further,
the Law must give the courts guidelines to follow each situation. This
Note outlined guidelines that may be used. Finally, the Company
Law should distinguish between tort and contract creditors.
China's legal system presents unique problems not found in the
common law system in the United States. Chinese law only allows
courts to interpret legislative mandates, thus the doctrine cannot be
amended through common law changes. China will have to continue
to amend the Company Law, and the veil piercing provision in
particular, to keep up with new situations.
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